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Professional Responsibility
BY WILLIAM H. FORTUNE*
his is a survey of recent (as of December 1997) Kentucky
ethics cases and Kentucky Bar Association ethics opinions. The
cases and opinions selected are those of general application
but special interest.
I. NON-DISCIPLINARY CASES
A. Insurance Defense Lawyers' Fees
Ifinsurance defense lawyers were asked to name the most important case
decided by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in recent years, American
Insurance Ass'n v. Kentucky Bar Association' would be the most likely
answer. The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in American Insurance cut
short the insurance industry's efforts to control litigation costs by hiring law
firms to handle the defense of insureds on a set-fee, rather than an hourly,
basis.
This case came to the court as an appeal by the insurance industry from
KBA E-368,2 an opinion of the Kentucky Bar Association ("KBA") Ethics
Committee and the Board of Governors. The issue in KBA E-368 was
whether it was ethical for an attorney to agree to contract with an insurer to
"Edward T. Breathitt Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1961,
J.D. 1964, University of Kentucky.
'American Ins. Ass'n v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996).
2See Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions, KY. BENCH & B., Fall
1994, at 52. Ethics and unauthorized practice (UPL) opinions issued before 1993
(through E-358 andU-45) are compiled and indexed in UNIVERSITY OFKENTUCKY
COLLEGE OF LAW, OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, KENTUCKY LEGAL
ETHICS OPINIONS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DESKBOOK (Richard H.
Underwood ed., 1993) [hereinafter DESKBOOK]. References to ethics and
unauthorized practice opinions before 1993 will be to the DESKBOOK. Opinions
issued in 1993 and later will be cited to the KENTUCKY BENCH & BAR. Opinions
issued after publication of the DESKBOOK are also found on the University of
Kentucky home page: <http//www.uky.edu/Law/kyethics>.
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represent its insureds on a set-fee basis - a certain sum for each case or a
certain sum for all cases within a given time period. The Ethics Committee
and the Board of Governors opined that set-fee arrangements in this context
create an impermissible conflict with the insureds of the company.
After KBA E-368, the insurance industry apparently believed that
attorneys would claim they could not ethically work on a set-fee basis, insist
on being paid by the hour, and pad their bills, resulting in higher defense costs
and reduced profits for the industry. The industry challenged KBA E-368 by
filing an appeal with the Kentucky Supreme Court within thirty days after the
opinion was published in the Kentucky Bench & Bar.
The industry also challenged KBA U-36,4 a 1981 unauthorized practice
opinion stating that an insurance company may not use in-house counsel
(salaried employees) to represent its insureds once suit is filed.5 KBA U-36
had relied on definitive statements by the Kentucky high court that a
corporation cannot legally practice law.6 Insurance companies had complied
with the mandate of the cases relied on in KBA U-36 and hired outside
counsel to represent their insureds after suit was filed. By challenging KBA
U-36 in the American Insurance case, the industry gave the Kentucky court
an opportunity to take another look at the issue.
Unfortunately for the insurance industry, the Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed both KBA U-36 and KBA E-368.7 With regard to KBA U-36, the
court rejected the holdings of cases from other jurisdictions,8 and approved
3 See Ky. Sup. Ct. R. [hereinafter S.C.R.] 3. 530(5) (Michie 1998).
4 See DESKBOOK, supra note 2, at 11-47.
' KBA U-36 approved in-house representation of the insured's interest before
suit is filed.
6 See Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1964)
(holding that trust companies are enjoined from practicing law, including preparing
and filing probate documents); Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co. of Louisville, 197
S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1946) (holding that trust company was prohibited from drafting
wills, trusts, and other legal documents as agents or fiduciaries for compensation
since such action constituted the practice of law), overruled in part by Frazee v.
Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965); Kendall v.
Beiling, 175 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1943) (holding that a corporation cannotbe licensed
to practice a learned profession).
7 See American Ins., 917 S.W.2d at 574.
' See In re Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Fla., 220 So.2d 6 (Fla.
1969) (denying approval of proposed regulation prohibiting attorneys employed by
insurers from also representing insureds); In re Petition of Youngblood, 895
S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1995) (finding no conflict of interest existed between an insurer
and attorneys representing insureds because the facts showed only a potential for
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the result in KBA U-36 on grounds of both unauthorized practice of law and
conflict between action as an employee of the insurer and as an advocate for
the insured.9 The court noted that a corporation cannot practice law because
it is" 'wholly incapable of acquiring the educational qualifications necessary
to obtain such license, [and cannot] possess in its corporate name the
necessary moral character required therefor."" 0 After thus impugning the
insurers' moral character, the court called their argument a "Polyannna
postulate that house counsel will continue to provide undivided loyalty to the
insured'"" and held that representation by house counsel is prohibited "as a
prophylactic measure not unlike the imputed disqualification rules.' 2
With regard to KBA E-368, the court opined that set-fee arrangements
between attorneys and liability insurers create impermissible conflicts with
insureds (who are the attorneys' "clients"). 3 While noting nineteen potential
conflicts between insured and insurer, 4 the court seemed most concerned
with the fact that attorneys might face financial loss in time-consuming cases,
which might cause the attorneys to provide inadequate representation of the
insureds. 5 The insurance companies pointed out that attorneys are obligated
to represent their clients with loyalty and zeal even if the fee has been
exhausted, and to do otherwise would be unethical. Furthermore, since in
most cases the insurer pays the claim, there is little likelihood of an insured
being damaged by the nonfeasance of the attorney selected by the insurer. In
the rare case in which an insured could show damage, the insured would have
a claim against the attorney or the insurer or both.16
The court gave short shrift to these arguments, saying that the "mere
appearance of impropriety is just as egregious as any actual or real conflict.' ' 7
It upheld KBA E-368 as a "prophylactic device to eliminate the potential for
a conflict of interest or the compromise of an attorney's ethical and
professional duties.' '8
However, the areas of potential conflict noted by the court - coverage
defenses and disagreement over settlements - have nothing to do with the
conflict and not an actual conflict).
9 See American Ins., 917 S.W.2d at 571.
'oId. (quoting Hobson, 197 S.W.2d at 460).
"Id.
121d.
'3 See id. at 573.
,4 See id.







method by which the insurer pays defense counsel. 9 A lawyer paid by an
insurance company to represent an insured will feel conflicted whenever the
interests of the insurer and insured diverge. The conflict is not affected by
paying the lawyer on a set fee, as opposed to an hourly basis.
Whether by design ornot, American Insurance protects lawyers from the
financial loss they would incur through underestimating the time and cost of
representation on a set-fee basis. In other contexts, lawyers are not protected
from the consequences ofunderestimating the complexity ofwork to be done
for a fee certain, and there is no logical reason why lawyers should be
specifically protected in an insurance defense practice.
B. Attorneys' Apparent Authority
In Clark v. Burden," plaintiff's counsel accepted defendant's offer of
$23,000 to settle plaintiff s personal injury claim. The settlement documents
and check were sent to plaintiff's counsel, who then returned the documents
and informed defense counsel that the settlement was off. The defendant
moved to enforce the agreement.
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court held that a settlement had
been reached. Furthermore, finding it unnecessary to decide whether or not
the plaintiff had given counsel actual authority to settle, the trial court held
that, by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, plaintiffs counsel was
clothed with apparent authority to settle. The court of appeals affirmed.21
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the attorney-
client relationship, without more, does not vest the attorney with either actual
or apparent settlement authority?22 The court relied on well-settled Kentucky
authority to support its decision?.
19 See generally WILLIAM H. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITIGATION AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK 497-538 (1996).
20 Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1996).
21 See id. at 575-76.
22 See id. at 576.
23 See id.; see also DeLong v. Owsley's Ex'x, 213 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1948)
(holding that an attorney cannot surrender a client's substantial right unless the
client has granted special authority to do so); Fillhardtv. Schmidt, 165 S.W.2d 155
(Ky. 1942) (holding that an attorney does not have the implied power to com-
promise and settle client's claim except in the case of an emergency); Shropshire
v. Shropshire, 138 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1940) (holding that an attorney has no power
to settle a case unless specifically authorized to do so by the client); Jenkins v. City
of Bowling Green, 88 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1935) (holding that an attorney cannot
settle a case without special authority unless an emergency exists); Brown v.
[VOL. 86
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The court's decision in Clark is sound. Kentucky's rules of professional
conduct state that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to
accept an offer of settlement of a matter."24 In negotiating with another
lawyer, a lawyer is bound to know that the other lawyer's client has the
ultimate settlement authority, and it is unreasonable for a lawyer to assume
otherwise.
Section 33 of the proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
states that it is for the client to decide whether and on what terms to settle a
claim, unless the client has given the attorney settlement authority. s
Therefore a client is not bound by an unauthorized settlement and:
[m]erely retaining a lawyer does not create apparent authority in the lawyer
to perform acts governed by § 33. When a lawyer purports to enter a
settlement binding on the client but lacks authority to do so, the burden of
inconvenience resulting ifthe client repudiates the settlement is properly left
with the opposing party, who should know that settlements are normally
subject to approval by the client and who has no manifested contrary
indication from the client. The opposing party can protect itself by obtaining
clarification of the lawyer's authority. Refusing to uphold a settlement
reached without the client's authority means that.the case remains open,
while upholding such a settlement deprives the client of the right to have the
claim resolved on other terms.26
However, a client is boundby an attorney's unauthorized settlement ifthe
client (not the attorney) leads the opposing party to reasonably believe that
the attorney has settlement authority.27 In Farmer's DepositBankv. Ripato,28
the client was actively involved in the negotiations and it was held reasonable
for the opposing counsel to assume that the client endorsed the attorney's
actions. The proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides
such an illustration: In open court with the clients present, the judge orders the
lawyers to appear at a conference with settlement authority and the clients say
Bunger, 43 S.W. 714 (Ky. 1897) (holding that an attorney cannot compromise a
lawsuit without his client's approval).
24 See S.C.R. 3.130-1.2.
25 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 (Proposed Final
Draft 1996).26 Id. § 39 cmt. d.
27 See id.; see generally FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 19, at 571.
' Fanner's Deposit Bank v. Ripato, 760 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1988).
1997-98]
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nothing to indicate disagreement. The clients' apparent agreement clothes the
lawyers with apparent authority.29
In Clark, the court dismissed the contention that its decision would lead
to unethical behavior by attorneys anxious to settle but lacking authority to
do so.3 The court noted that responsible lawyers "would not think of settling
a case without express client authority and certainly wouldnot attempt to gain
an advantage by unscrupulous negotiating tactics."'
After rejecting the claim of apparent authority as a basis for enforcing an
unauthorized settlement, the court opened the door to a claim of detrimental
reliance based on apparent authority. The court said:
At some point, however, the client must be charged with responsibility for
having employed an attorney who failed to observe the requirements of
fidelity to the client's wishes. That point, we believe, is when the rights of
innocent third persons are adversely affected .... Even if the trial court finds
that no [actual] authority was given, if it should also find that appellees were
substantially and adversely affected by their reliance upon the purported
settlement, enforcement would be appropriate.32
Presumably, the court had in mind the situation where a party does nothing
to disavow an unauthorized settlement and the opposing party changes
position in reliance on the settlement. In Combs'Administrator v. Virginia
Iron, Coal & Coke Co.,33 the Kentucky high court relied on the equitable
doctrine of laches to hold that the client's failure to act ratified the
settlement.34 As between two parties - one who unreasonably relied on an
attorney's apparent authority, and one who did not disavow in a timely
fashion - equitably, the loss should be borne by the latter.
In Clark, however, the court did not require the trial court on remand to
find either that the plaintiff misled the defendant or that the plaintiff failed to
timely disavow the settlement in order to bind the plaintiff to the settlement.
The opinion in Clark merely directed the trial court to decide whether the
defendant relied on the settlement to its detriment.3
29 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 cmt. d, ill. 4
(Proposed Final Draft 1996).30 See Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Ky. 1996).
3 1 Id.
32Id. (emphasis added).
3 Combs' Adm'r v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 33 S.W.2d 649 (Ky.
1931).
34 Accord RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 32 cmt. f (Proposed
Final Draft 1996).
35 See Clark, 917 S.W.2d at 577.
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In this respect, Clark is subject to criticism. Detrimental reliance by the
defendant, without some "fault" on the plaintiff s part, should not be enough
to mandate enforcement of a settlement. Detrimental reliance should not
operate retroactively to create apparent authority. The court shouldrevisit this
issue when an appropriate opportunity arises.
In another aspect of its opinion, the court directed the trial court to
determine whether the client had in fact authorized or accepted the
settlement. 6 The attorney would have had actual authority (express or
implied) if the client had authorized the settlement. The court noted that
resolving this issue might require the attorney to testify to otherwise
confidential conversations.3 1
Justice King dissented, saying that clients do clothe their lawyers with
apparent authority to settle .3 An attorney who settles without authority might
be liable to the client, but the client should be held to the bargain. Justice King
viewed the remedy for detrimental reliance to be illusory.39 A defendant who
settles a case will rarely be able to prove that its position has worsened as a
result of the settlement. In Justice King's view, attorneys should be able to
rely on each others' claims of settlement authority; requiring proof of
authority, in his opinion, impedes the negotiation process.4
While there is respectable case law from other jurisdictions supporting
the dissent,4" the court's opinion in Clark is in line with the Restatement and
the Model Rules. 4 The client normally should be present, or available by
electronic communication, during negotiations. If the client cannot be
available, it is not unreasonable to ask for proof of settlement authority.
Of course, attorneys often will take the word of opposing attorneys that
they have settlement authority. Rarely will a lawyer intentionally mislead an
opponent to believe he has authority which he knows he does not have. In
those rare instances of intentional misconduct, the attorney should be liable
to the opposing party for any loss reasonably incurred.43 Furthermore, it is
36 See id.
See id.; see also S.C.R. 3.130-1.6(b).
See Clark, 917 S.W.2d at 578 (King, J., dissenting).
See id. (King, J., dissenting).
40 See id. at 577-90 (King, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., Capital Dredge and Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 800 F.2d 525
(6th Cir. 1986) (Michigan law).
42 See S.C.R. 3.130-1.2, 1.4.
43 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 42(3) (Proposed
Final Draft 1996); cf Prewitt v. Sexton, 777 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1989) (finding
attorney liability for instituting frivolous lawsuit).
1997-98]
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possible that the Kentucky courts might hold attorneys liable for negligently
leading others to rely on their settlement authority.44
C. Appearance ofImpropriety
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility45 cautioned lawyers
against engaging in conduct that might give the appearance of impropriety.
The Model Rules, however, do not endorse this rubric in any of the rules or
comments. In the context of disqualification, the Kentucky version of the
Model Rules states:
This rubric has a two-fold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety
proscribed can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that
might make a r'ormer client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted,
disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective
judgmentby the former client. Second, since "impropriety" isundefined, the
term "appearance of impropriety" is question-begging. 6
In spite of the Model Rules' rejection of an "appearances" standard, two
recent Kentucky Supreme Court cases favora"Caesar'swife' standard over
applicable Model Rules comments.
In Whitakerv. Commonwealth, 8 a former public defendertookaposition
withtheprosecutor. She obviously couldnot prosecute in cases where shehad
represented the defendant, and she was screened from any participation in
those cases. The issue was whether the entire office was disqualified.
When the issue first arose a dozen years earlier, the court refused to
disqualify the entire office. In Summit v. Mudd,49 the court said that the "mere
possibility" of the appearance of impropriety created by a defense lawyer
joining the prosecutor's office should not result in disqualification of the
4 Cf. Seigle v. Jasper, 867 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a
lawyer may be liable to property purchasers for negligence if he or she fails to
exercise ordinary care in performing a title examination).
4 5 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1983).
46 S.C.R. 3.130-1.10 cmt. 9.
47 PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBEL GRECIANS AND ROMANS 860 (John
Dryden trans. & Arthur Hugh Clough rev., The Modem Library 1932) (When
asked why he parted with his wife, Caesar said, "I wished my wife to be not so
much as suspected."); see FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 19, at 86.
41 Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 895 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1995).
49 Summit v. Mudd, 679 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1984).
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entire prosecutor's office. In Summit, the court held that the proper test was
whether there was "actual prejudice as a result of a breach of the
attorney/client confidentiality." 50
Summitwas decidedbefore the adoption ofthe Model Rules. Model Rule
1.1 1,51 effective in 1990, is consistent with Summit. In the case of attorneys
moving between private employment and governmental service, or between
governmental agencies, the rule rejects vicarious disqualification if the
personally disqualified lawyer is sufficiently screened from the case.52
In Whitaker, the prosecutor stated for the record that the former defense
lawyer had had no contact with the case afterjoining the prosecutor's office.
Because the case was virtually identical to Summit, the trial court denied the
defense motion to disqualify the prosecutor. The Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed. The court held that if the attorney had participated personally and
substantially in the accused's defense then she, and the entire office, must be
disqualified.Y While the court did not acknowledge that it was overruling
Summit, that is the effect of the decision.
In reaching this result, the court read Rule 1.11 as if the comments, but
not the rule, addressed the issue of vicarious disqualification.- The court then
said that the comment disapproving disqualification could be ignored,
because it is merely a comment. The court's analysis is strained. In the first
place, official comments should not be ignored. Secondly, Rule 1.11 clearly
disapproves vicarious disqualification in the context of lawyers moving
between government agencies or into governmental service. Rule 1.11(a)
specifically allows screening as a means to avoid vicarious disqualification
when a lawyer is moving from government service to private practice. It
makes no sense to construe the rule to disallow screening when an employee
is moving between government agencies, or from private practice to a
government agency.
The Whitaker decision is about appearances. The court spoke not about
an actual violation of an attorney-client confidence, but rather about the
"potentially chilling effect" on other relationships.55 The underlying
assumption in Whitaker is that disqualification must be ordered when
someone (perhaps potential clients of public defenders) might think
something is amiss, even though it is not.
50 Id.
51 S.C.R. 3.130- 1.11.
52See S.C.R. 3.130-1.11 cmts. 4 and 9.
3 See Whitaker, 895 S.W.2d at 955-56.54 See id.
55See id. at 956.
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In Lovell v. Winchester, 6 the court went one step further and stated that
it will apply an appearance standard as an independent ground for
disqualification of counsel.57 Lovell involved an attorney who met with a
prospective client and received and retained the client's documents, then
rejected the case, returned the documents, and wound up representing the
prospective client's opponent. The attorney resisted disqualification by
asserting that he could remember nothing about the meeting with the
prospective client. The court held that the attorney must be disqualified. The
court looked to the definition of "client" in the Rules of Evidence: "'[one]
who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services
from the lawyer."'"8 The court then said: "After King [the attorney] retained
documents pertaining to the case for a month, the presumption arises that he
became knowledgeable of their contents and that he learned confidential
information relevant to the case." 9
The court held that the attorney must be disqualified. The result is not
surprising and couldhavebeenreachedby simply relying on the former client
rule. Rule 1.9 provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter. (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation. 60
Rule 1.9 contains no exception for an attorney who has forgotten whatever he
learned in the former representation. Once the court decided that King had an
attorney-client relationship with the prospective client, straightforward
application of Rule 1.9 required disqualification.
However, the court went on to state that, even if a rule of conduct had not
been violated, the appearance of impropriety required disqualification:
Even though the comment to Rule 1.9 specifically rejects the
"appearance of impropriety" standard in favor of a fact-based test applied to
determine whether the lawyer's duty of loyalty and confidentiality to a
former client will likely be compromised by the subsequent representation,
the appearance of impropriety is still a useful guide for ethical decisions ....
s6 Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997).
7 See id. at 468-69.





... For these reasons, courts still retain the appearance of impropriety
standard as an independent basis of assessment.6'
Lovell creates uncertainty. The implication is that trial courts should
disqualify counsel whenever counsel's representation appears improper. To
whom, however, must the representation appear improper? The judge? The
client? The press? Members of the public?
The court has not yet disciplined a lawyer on the basis of an appearance
of impropriety.62 It would violate due process to rest discipline on such a
vague standard.63 However, now that it is clear that the court is concerned
with appearances, lawyers might assume they can be disciplined for conduct
that violates no rule but doesn't "pass the smell test." If so, the pernicious
effect of the appearances "standard" extends beyond disqualification in
conflict cases.
D. Contacting Employees ofan Opponent Represented by Counsel
In Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis,' the Kentucky Supreme Court directed the
trial court to disqualify an attorney who had taken statements from Lee's 65
managers before filing asexual harassment action against Lee's. The attorney
took the statements knowing that Lee's was represented by counsel in the
matter and without the consent of that counsel. The court disqualified counsel
and ordered the managers' statements suppressed. The rule applied by the
court in Shoney's was Rule 4.2, which says that a lawyer shall not knowingly
communicate with a represented party without the consent of that party's
counsel.' In finding that Lee's managers were represented parties, the court
turned to the Official Comment to Rule 4.2, which says that the Rule prohibits
communications with"'persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf
of the organization.' "" The court further found that the prohibition applied
61Lovell, 941 S.W.2d at 468-69 (emphasis added).
62 But see Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Marcum, 830 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1992) (viola-
tion of specific rule but appearance of impropriety language also used).
63 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (holding that a
Nevada Supreme Court rule which prohibited extrajudicial statements likely to
prejudice adjudicative proceedings was void for vagueness).
64 Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1994).
61 Shoney's was doing business as Lee's Famous Recipe Chicken.
66 See S.C.R. 3.130-4.2.
67Shoney's, 875 S.W.2d at 515 (quoting S.C.R. 1.130-4.2, comment 2).
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before the filing of suit, since the word"party" in Rule 4.2 does not imply that
the rule is limited to situations in which one has become a "party" by the
filing of suit.68
The sequence of events in K-Mart Corp. v. Helton69 was as follows:
Norris was charged with shoplifting at K-Mart. He obtained counsel and the
criminal charges were dismissed. Four days later, the loss manager of K-Mart
requested a meeting with Norris' lawyer. They met and Norris' lawyer took
the manager's statement. Norris later filed suit against K-Mart for slander,
assault, and false imprisonment. K-Mart then sought to have Norris' attorney
disqualified on the basis of Shoney's, arguing that the attorney had met with
a management employee of a corporate defendant without the consent of the
corporation's counsel. 0
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
disqualify counsel.71 In distinguishing Shoney's, the court pointed out that K-
Mart had not told plaintiff's counsel that he should not talk to the loss
manager without K-Mart's lawyer being present. In fact, K-Mart had not
notified plaintiff's counsel that it was represented by counsel until a year after
the interview of the loss manager. Plaintiff s counsel was not required to
assume that the corporate defendant was represented by counsel in the
shoplifting matter. 2
Helton significantly limits Shoney's. A lawyer investigating a possible
claim against a corporation may assume that the corporation is not
represented in the matter - even though everyone knows that large
corporations have in-house counsel or counsel on retainer to protect their
interests. Proceeding on the assumption that the corporation is not
represented, the attorney may interview its employees without notice to the
corporation, until the corporation notifies plaintiff's counsel that it is
represented in the matter.73
68See id. at 515-16. In 1995, the American Bar Association House ofDelegates
substituted "person" for "party" in ABA Model Rule 4.2 to make it clear that the
no-contact rule does not require that the represented person be a "party" to
litigation. See FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 19, at 199.69 K-Mart Corp. v. Helton, 894 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1995).
70 See id. at 630-3 1.
71 See id. at 631.72 See id.
'3 Two ethics opinions, E-381 and E-382, flesh out Rule 4.2 and the Shoney's
case. See infra notes 130-137 and accompanying text; see also Richard H.




Most of the Kentucky Supreme Court's disciplinary cases in recent years
fall in the usual categories and do not warrant further comment: (1) false
statements to the tribunal;74 (2) dishonesty;75 (3) neglect;76 and (4) criminal
conduct"7 The following cases, however, are noteworthy:
A. Substance Abuse
In Kentucky BarAss'n v. Rankin,8 the court dealt with an attorney who
had thrice been convicted of driving under the influence. Following the
recommendation of the Board of Governors, the court issued a public
reprimand and a six-month suspension of the attorney's license to practice
law. The court probated the suspension on the condition that the attorney not
drink, attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and cooperate with his AA
sponsor. The court named an attorney to supervise the probationer during the
two-yearprobation period andreport quarterly to the executive director ofthe
Kentucky Bar Association. The supervising attorney was charged with the
responsibility of checking on the probationer's AA attendance, checking
court records, and otherwise monitoring the probationer's compliance with
the terms of probation.7 9
Rankin is significant for several reasons. Since the rules do not provide
forprobation, 0 the case demonstrates the court's belief that it has the inherent
authority to probate a penalty. Secondly, the case demonstrates the court's
willingness to work with Alcoholics Anonymous"1 to help substance abusers
while protecting the public.
74 See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jacob, 950 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1997);
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Devers, 936 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1996).
75 See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Kirk, 942 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1997).76 See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Clay, 932 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. 1996).
"7 See, e.g., Futrell v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 950 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1997);
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Huffinan, 908 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1995) (uncharged criminal
conduct).
78Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Rankin, 862 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1993).
79See id. at 895.
10 See S.CR. 3.380 (listing degrees of discipline without including probation).
81 See Rankin, 862 S.W.2d at 895-96 (limiting discipline to public reprimand
and six-month suspension of license if respondent lawyer continued to attend




The attorney's actions in Kentucky Bar Ass 'n v. Waller82 were, to put it
mildly, intemperate. He questioned the impartiality of the presiding judge,
who recused himself. Waller then filed a motion with the special judge in
which he referred to the regular judge as a "lying incompetent, ass-hole." 83
Waller was cited for contempt and his response to the contempt citation was
bizarre. He referred to himself as an "old honkey [ ] ... [with] pee run[ning]
down his leg in dribbles," and ended by saying "it requires one to identify an
ass hole when he sees one."84 He was held in contempt, fined, and sentenced
to thirty days in jail. 5
Disciplinary proceedings were then commenced. The supreme court
rejected his First Amendment argument and found that his intemperate
language violated Rule 8.2(a), which proscribes false statements about the
qualifications of a judge.86 The court suspended the lawyer for six months
because "[t]here can never be justification for a lawyer to use such scurrilous
language with respect to a judge.., in open court.... Officers of the Court
are required to uphold the dignity of the Court of Justice... "87
Waller is reminiscent of Kentucky Bar Ass "n v. Jernigan," a case in
which the lawyer, after being insulted by the judge in the hall of the
courthouse, kicked the judge in the groin. The lawyer later attacked the judge
in the local newspaper.89 In Jernigan, the court publicly sanctioned the
attorney, though a dissenting justice would have opted for aprivate reprimand
on the theory that the judge had provoked the attack.90
Cases like Waller andJernigan evidence the court's understandable lack
of tolerance for rude behavior. However, disciplining a lawyer for an opinion
potentially implicates the lawyer's First Amendment right to freedom of
expression.91 In the Ninth Circuit case of Standing Committee on Discipline
82 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Waller, 929 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1996), cert. denied,
Waller v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 117 S. Ct. 949 (1997).831 d. at 181.
84 Id. at 182.
11 See id. at 181-82.6 See S.C.R. 3.130-8.2(a).
87 Waller, 929 S.W.2d at 183.
" Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jernigan, 737 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1987).
89 See id. at 694 ("The second violation occurred on December 8, 1983, when
Jernigan had published in the Tompkinsville News an article referring to [Judge]
Wood... in scurrilous language.").90 See id. at 694-95 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
9' See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (reiterating First
Amendment protection afforded stated opinions about public figures and public
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of the United States District Court for the Central District of California v.
Yagman,92 the court of appeals reversed a disciplinary sanction imposed on
a lawyer who had called the judge "ignorant, dishonest, ill-tempered, and a
bully,... buffoon[,] ... sub-standard human[, and] ... right-wing fanatic."' 9
The court held that the First Amendment protects opinion, even rough and
intemperate opinion, so long as the criticism does not state or imply false
facts.94
In Waller, the ground for discipline was Rule 8.2(a), which proscribes
statements known to be false or made with reckless disregard for the truth.95
The insult in Waller can be divided into its factual ("lying") and opinion
("incompetent ass-hole") parts. The First Amendment will tolerate
disciplining a lawyer for factual misstatements about ajudge.96 On the other
hand, lawyers are entitled to express their opinions about judges in a
respectful manner. The unresolved question is whether a lawyer may be
disciplined for expressing an opinion in a disrespectful fashion.97
C. Excessive Fees
Kentucky BarAssociation v. Profumo 98 is a significant disciplinary case.
The lawyer acted as executor and attorney for an estate. He paid himself
$5000 for legal services to the testatrix, $101,500 as an executor's fee, and
$27,000 as an attorney's fee. In addition, he collected $11,500 as a real estate
commission for selling the deceased's home. These actions took place before
the adoption of the Model Rules; therefore, the lawyer was cited for violating
the excessive fee provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 9
Without court approval the maximum executor's fee would have been
$23,225.1' The attorney argued that he was not subject to discipline for an
officials).
92 Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. v.
Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
93 Id. at 1434 n.4.94 See id. at 1444-45; see also FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 19, at 292.
91 See S.C.R. 3.130-8.2(a).
96See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1980) (holding
that referring to a judge's behavior as "highly unethical and grossly unfair" at a
press conference was unwarranted given lack of good faith and highly public
forum).
9' See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Nal, 599 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1980) (disciplining
lawyer for calling an administrative hearing a "kangaroo court").
9' Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Profumo, 931 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1996).
99 See id. at 149-50 (citing DR 2-106(A) of the Code of Professional Conduct




excessive fee since he was not acting as an attorney. In response to this
argument, the court pointed out that the attorney was acting as a fiduciary and
was subject to discipline for abuse of his position.'0'
The court further held that it was improper for the lawyer to pay himself
as both executor and attorney without court approval. To receive dual
compensation, one must have been named in the will as both attorney and
executor, and, even then, any attorney's fee must be reasonable and
documented.02
The court also found that the attorney had a conflict of interest in the sale
of the house and had misrepresented certain matters to the court in the
settlement statements.0 3 As a result of these violations, the attorney was
suspended for three years.104
D. Transactions with Clients
Lawyers who might do business deals with their clients should be aware
that they will be considered fiduciaries for their clients, not arms-length
business partners, in the event that the business does not go well. Rule 1.8(a)
states that:
a lawyer shall not enter a business transaction with a client unless: 1) the
transaction is fair and reasonable to the client and the terms disclosed in
writing in amannerwhich can be reasonably understood by the client; 2) the
client has an opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel; and 3)
the client consents in writing. 05
In Underhill v. Kentucky Bar Ass 'n'° the attorney sold a laundromat to
his client. The attoriey acted as surety on the client's bank loan. The client
defaulted on the loan, the attorney was brought in as surety, and the attorney
foreclosed on the client's house, which had been pledged as collateral. The
client counterclaimed against the attorney for breach of fiduciary duty andthe
jury found for the client. A disciplinary proceeding was then brought and the
court publicly reprimanded the attorney for failing to comply with the
provisions of Rule 1.8107 because there had been no opportunity for the client
101 See id. at 151 (citing comment 3 to S.C.R. 3.130-8.3).
'
02 See id.
103 See id. at 152-53.
'0o See id. at 153.
10' S.C.R. 3.130-1.8(a).
"0 Underhill v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 937 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1997).
107 See S.C.R. 3.130-1.8(a).
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to consult independent counsel and no written consent was given by the
client. The reprimand was given even though there was no showing that the
terms of sale were unfair or that the attorney had engaged in fraud or
overreaching. When the business failed, the lawyer was the loser, both
financially and by injury to his reputation.
More evidence that lawyers who enter into business deals with their
clients become de facto insurers of the business's success comes from
Kentucky BarAss 'n v. Smith,08 a case decided in 1984 but not reported until
1994.'9 The lawyer in Smith induced a client to loan money to a business in
which the lawyer held an interest. The business failed and the client lost his
money. The court suspendedthe lawyer for eighteen months. While there was
evidence on which the court could have found misrepresentation, the court
did not rest its opinion on that ground. The court said,
Respondent engaged in these activities culminating in preparing acheck and,
to that extent, participated in a transaction whereby one client lent money to
a corporation in which respondent had a substantial interest A lawyer
simply cannot defend hgainst a charge of unethical and unprofessional
conduct in such a scenario. In placing himself in this position, respondent
incurs the penalty imposed as recommended by the Kentucky Board ofBar
Governors to this court. It is only for the reason that we cannot be sure from
the evidence as to the actual misrepresentation that we do not impose a more
severe penalty." 0
It is evident that the court believes that lawyers should not do business with
their clients; lawyers who do must recognize that they are fiduciaries for the
clients and will be held to very high standards of conduct.
E. Failure to Communicate
Lawyers are subject to discipline for neglecting the work they have been
hired to perform.' In addition, lawyers should keep their clients informed
about the status of matters and respond promptly to reasonable requests for
10 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Smith, 878 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1984) (received for
publication June 20, 1994).
" The opinion states that it was received by the publisher in 1994. There is no
explanation for the 10-year delay in submitting it for publication.
1o Smith, 878 S.W.2d at 7.
1" See S.C.R. 3.130-1.3.
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information. 12 Unlike the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however,
Kentucky's version does not make failure to communicate a disciplinary
offense."3 In spite ofthenon-mandatorynature ofRule 3.130-1.4,114 the court
often cites the rule as one of the bases for discipline.115 With one exception, "
6
however, the court has relied on other rules in addition to Rule 1.4 in
disciplining attorneys. The references to Rule 1 A in those cases might,
therefore, be considered"harmless error."However, the court shouldnot refer
to Rule 1.4 as if it contained the word "shall."
III. ETHICS AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OPINIONS
Rule 3.530 furthers the educational mission of the court and bar by
providing that an attorney may ask a member of the Ethics Committee (a
"hot-line" member) for advice about the ethical propriety of contemplated
conduct. 1'7 The requesting attorney is protected from discipline ifthe attorney
follows the advice of the hot-line member, as long as the attorney's portrayal
of the problem was complete and accurate.I"
Hot-line members refer interesting questions to the Ethics Committee. In
addition, local bar associations may ask the Committee for advisory
opinions."' Matters which seem to be of general importance are discussed at
meetings of the Ethics Committee, and formal opinions are prepared for
consideration by the Board of Governors. The Board can approve, modify, or
disapprove Ethics Committee opinions. In addition, the Board can approve
the opinion but direct that it be issued to the requesting attorney as an
112 Cf Christine S. Filip & Ann E. Johnston, Misleading Message May Spark
a Suit, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1997, at D1 (commenting on the large number of
lawsuits sparked by lawyers' failure to keep their clients informed and the
willingness of disciplinary bodies to impose harsh penalties on lawyers who do not
diligently communicate with their clients).
13 S.C.R. 3.130-1.4 uses the language "should," while ABA Model Rule 1.4
says that a lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed. See ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1992).
114 See supra note 113.
"5 See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Hatcher, 929 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1996);
Munroe v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 927 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1996); Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Thomas, 927 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1996).
"
6 See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Davenport, 855 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1993) (relying
solely on S.C.R. 3.130-1.4 as grounds for a public reprimand).
17 See S.C.R. 3.530(1).
H See id. 3.530(3).
"9 See id. 3.530(1).
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informal (i.e., private) opinion. 20 The Unauthorized Practice Committee
functions in the same way as the Ethics Committee except that most of the
questions are posed by local bar associations concerned about non-lawyers
practicing law.' The Unauthorized Practice Committee also considers
unauthorized practice questions that come to the Ethics Committee through
its hot-line members." Like ethics opinions, unauthorized practice opinions
are referred to the Board of Governors, which has the final say on whether
and in what form opinions are released.ln
Formal ethics and unauthorized practice opinions approved bythe Board
of Governors are published - in full or synopsis form - in Kentucky Bench &
Bar, the publication of the Kentucky Bar Association. 24 Ethics and
unauthorized practice opinions are not published in the Southwestern
Reporter or inthe annotations to the KentuckyRevised Statutes. Furthermore,
the opinions in the Bench & Bar are not indexed.
The governing rule states that ethics and unauthorized practice opinions
are advisory only."z They do not have the force of law, and lawyers are not
obligated to follow them. Nevertheless, ethics and unauthorized practice
opinions shape attorney behavior and thus form part of the fabric of the law
of professional responsibility. The following recent opinions are particularly
significant.
A. Compensation of Witnesses
KBA E-394126 disapproves paying expert witnesses on a contingent fee
basis but approves payments for litigation support services (non-witnesses)
on that basis. This opinion is consistent with the view that a fee arrangement
should not give a witness a stake in the outcome. The expert whose fee does
not depend on the outcome will presumably have less incentive to favor the
side that hired him.
120 See id. 3.530(2).
12. See id. 3.530(1) ("Local bar associations may also request advisory opin-
ions."). It is the author's experience that it is generally local bars that ask about
unauthorized practice.
" The author is aware of this practice of referral from the Ethics Committee
through his membership on that committee.
123 See S.C.R. 3.530(2).
24 See id. 3.530(4).
"
2 See id. 3.530(3).
'
26 Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-394, Ky. BENCH
&B., Spring 1997, at 100.
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In KBA E-400,127 the Board and Committee gave a qualified yes to the
issue of compensating non-expert witnesses for time spent in meeting with
lawyers and otherwise preparing for trial. KBA E-400 provides:
This question was thoroughly considered by the ABA Standing Committee
on Professional Responsibility inABAFormal Opinion 96-402 (1996). The
question posed was whether "[a] lawyer, acting on her client's behalf, may
compensate a non-expert witness for time spent in attending a deposition or
trial or in a meeting with the lawyer preparatory to such testimony, provided
that the payment is not conditioned on the content of the testimony and
provided further that the payment does not violate the law of the
jurisdiction." The Committee answered the question in the affirmative,
noting that there was nothing to indicate that the drafters of the Model Rules
intended to be more restrictive than the drafters ofthe Code. The Committee
also alluded to ABA Prosecution Standard 3-3.2, which states that "it is not
improper to reimburse an ordinary witness for the reasonable expenses of
attendanceupon court, attendance for depositions pursuantto statute orcourt
rule, or attendance for pretrial interview. Payments to a witness may be for
transportation and loss of income provided there is no attempt to conceal the
fact of reimbursement" To summarize, ABA Formal Opinion 94-402
(1996) specifically approved of compensating a non-expert witness for time
spent in actually attending a deposition or a trial, and for time spent in
pretrial interviews in preparation for trial, and for time spent in reviewing
and researching records that are germane to his or her testimony, so long as
the payment is not being made for the substance or the efficacy of the
witness's testimony, and provided that such compensation is not barred by
local law.128
However, the opinion cautions against the payment of undocumented
expenses.
KRPC 3A(b) allows the lawyer, but does not compel the lawyer, to
compensate a witness for reasonable out ofpocket expenses and reasonable
lost income that will actually be incurred by the witness while testifying at
a trial, hearing, or deposition, or while engaging in necessary preparation
with the attorney. The Committee is of the opinion that additional payments
are imprudent, and may be questioned as being unethical or even illegal.
'
27 Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-400, KY. BENCH
& B., Summer 1997, at 52.2 11d. at 53.
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Obviously, no payment may be made for the substance or efficacy of the
witness's testimony.'29
The caveat expressed in E-400 should be adhered to. Paying a non-expert for
the value of the "time" spent preparing to testify might appear to be payment
for testimony, which, of course, is unethical and illegal. Lawyers are well-
advised to reimburse non-experts only for lost wages and out-of-pocket
expenses.
B. Contacting Persons Represented by Counsel
In KBA E-38 1130 and KBA E-3 82,131 the Ethics Committee answered the
following questions: (1) May a lawyer communicate with a former employee
ofan organization without the consent ofthe organization's lawyer? (Answer:
Yes);32 (2) May a lawyer communicate with a manager without the consent
of the organization's lawyer? (Answer: No, citing Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis13 );
(3) May a lawyer communicate with a non-manager employee whose acts or
omissions in connection with a matter cannot be imputed to the organization
andwhose statements about the matter will not constitute an admission of the
organization? (Answer: Yes);13 1 (4) May a lawyer communicate with a non-
manager employee whose acts or omissions in connection with a matter may
be imputed to the organization or whose statements about a matter may be
admissible against the organization? (Answer: No). 35
The answer to the first question is consistent with the logic and language
of Model Rule 4.2, 31 but was not decided by Shoney 's. The second question
was answered by Shoney's, and the opinion merely restates the rule from
Shoney's. The third and fourth questions and answers were taken from the
same comment relied on by the court in Shoney's. The opinion serves,
therefore, as a good prediction of what the court would do in the first, third,
129 [d.
"' Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-381, KY. BENCH
&B., Fall 1995, at44.
'' Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-382, KY. BENCH
& B., Fall 1995, at 44.
132 See supra note 130.
... See supra note 131; Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1994)
(disqualifying lawyer for taking statements from two of opposing party's senior
managers without consent of opposing party).
'
34 See supra note 131.
'




and fourth situations. There are contrary views, however,'37 and it is far from
clear that the court would adopt the position of E-381 and E-382. The court
might extend the no-contact rule to all employees; on the other hand, it might
limit Shoney s to employees of managerial status. The court might even rej ect
E-381 and hold that former employees are off-limits as well as current
employees.
The question in KBA E-392138 was whether corporate counsel may talk
to an employee about the employee's suit against the corporation without the
consent of the employee's counsel. The opinion "affirm[s] the obvious, ' -
that the corporation's counsel is obligated to follow the no-contact rule, just
as would be the case if the suit were brought by a stranger.
KBA E-393 14 makes it clear that an insurance adjuster, even an adjuster
who also is a lawyer, does not "represent" the insured for the purpose of the
no-contact rule. Thus the claimant's attorney does not need the consent of the
adjusterbefore contacting the insured. The no-contact rule does not come into
play until suit is filed and an attorney is retained for the insured.'4
Finally, KBA E-3 65142 opines that a lawyer does not"necessarily"violate
the no-contact rule if the lawyer's client talks to a represented party without
the consent ofthat party's lawyer. The opinion warns, however, that a lawyer
who suggests that his client contact the opponent might be guilty of
circumventing the no-contact rule.143
C. The Misaddressed Fax
KBA E-37414 states that a lawyer should refrain from examining
misaddressed letters, faxes, and electronic messages, but may retain the
communication and make a good faith claim that confidentiality andprivilege
have been waived by the sender. At the same time, the opinion cautions
137 See FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 19, at 203-07.
131 Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-392, KY. BENCH
& B., Winter 1997, at 42.
139 Id.
14o Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-393, iY. BENCH
& B., Winter 1997, at 42.
141 See id.
142Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-365, KY. BENCH
& B., Summer 1994, at 40.
143 See id.
' Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-3 74, KY. BENCH
& B., Spring 1996, at 42.
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against claiming "inadvertent waiver" until the Kentucky court decides what
constitutes waiver.
The Committee and the Board are in agreement with the view expressed in
ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 (1992) that when a lawyer receives materials
under circumstances in which it is clear that they were not intended for the
receiving lawyer, the lawyer should refrain from examining the materials,
notify the sender, and abide by the senders [sic] instructions regarding the
disposition of the materials. See ABA Formal Op. 92-368; D.C. Op. 256
(1995).
... Lawyers are strongly urged to return such materials unread, but if
the caselaw permits, a lawyer is entitled to argue a good faith claim of
"waiver" before the court in which an action is pending. See KRPCs 3.1 and
3.4(c) (... "open refusal [to follow a rule] based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists.") Maine Op. See also Resolution Trust Corp. v. First
American Bank, 10 ABA/BNA Law.Man.Prof.Con. 365 (W. D. Mich.
1994); Kusch v. Ballard, 10 ABA/BNA Law.Man.Prof.Con. 366 (Fla. App.
1994) (refusing to disqualify counsel on the facts of the case, and alluding
to the possibility [unlikely perhaps] that a lawyer might deliberately "fax"
something to opposing counsel to set that lawyer up for disqualification).
However, the Committee and the Board caution counsel that any claim
or "inadvertent waiver" is made at the risk of exclusion of evidence and
disqualification. The concept of "inadvertent waiver" of attorney-client
privilege has been rejected by many courts on the grounds that waiver is
thought to require the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, and that
only the client can waive the privilege.' 45
Eventually, the Kentucky Supreme Court will provide guidance on the
issue of inadvertent waiver ofprivilege. There are three views: (1) inadvertent
disclosure, even without fault, waives the privilege; 1 (2) negligent disclosure
waives the privilege; 147 and (3) only intentional disclosure waives the
privilege. 148 Since Kentucky Rule of Evidence 509 149 seems to require
45 Id. at 42-43.
'
46 See FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 19, at 194 (the Wigmore view).
147 See id. (middle-ground approach recommended by the proposed Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers).
148 See id.
149K.R.E. 509 (Michie 1998).
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intentional disclosure,"' until the court rules on the matter, attorneys should
assume that misaddressed messages do not lose their privileged character.
D. Non-refundable Retainers
In KBA E-380,'11 the Committee and Board cautiously approved the
concept of a "non-refundable retainer," that is, money paid in advance for
services to be rendered with no promise of a refund if the client decides to fire
the lawyer. After acknowledging that there is authority to the contrary,5 2 the
Committee said:
In determining the "reasonableness" ofa lawyer's fee, the factors mentioned
in Rule 1.5(a) apply, and the lawyer has the responsibility to prove the
"reasonableness" of the fee applying principles of equity and fairness.
Although "reasonableness" at the time of contracting is relevant,
consideration is also to be given to whether events occurred after the fee
agreementwas made which rendered the fee agreement fair at the time itwas
entered into, but unfair at the time of enforcement. See McKenzie Const.,
Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97 (3rd Cir. 1985). Hence, the client may be
entitled to a return of some portion ofthe "non-refundable" fee retainer upon
the termination of the representation, depending upon all the circumstances;
that is, the "reasonableness" of the fee.
Accepting representation often precludes a lawyer from taking on other
matters, at present and in the future, and the employment of a lawyer may
confer immediate benefits on the client We also note that the client does not
have an absolute right to discharge counsel, rather, the client has the absolute
power to do so. The lawyer-client arrangement is a contractual arrangement,
and while the lawyer has obligations, the lawyer also has rights. The client
who discharges a lawyer has an obligation to the lawyer for the payment of
"reasonable" compensation. The question in every case is whether the
compensation claimed is "reasonable" under the terms of the agreement and
under the circumstances.
We agree with those authorities who hold that a "reasonable" fee may
be made "non-refundable" and deposited into the lawyer's general office
So "A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure
waives the privilege if he... voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any
significant part of the privileged matter." Id.
... Richard H. Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions: KBA E-380, KY. BENCH
& B., Fall 1995, at 43.
152 See In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that
nonrefundable fee agreements clash with public policy).
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account as any other earned fee. Accordingly, we find that in order for a
non-refundable fee retainer to be valid the arrangement must meet the
following criteria:
1. The arrangement must be fully explained to the client, orally,
and in a written fee agreement that is signed by the client;
2. The arrangement must specify the dollar amount of the retainer,
and its application of the scope of the representation, and/or the time
frame in which the agreement will exist; and
3. The total fee to be charged must be "reasonable." 153
Several aspects of this opinion are worthy of comment. The opinion
acknowledges that a client who discharges an attorney might be entitled to a
refund of a portion of the fee, thus making the "non-refundable" retainer
refundable. The opinion characterizes such action as an exercise ofpower,
rather than an exercise of right."
Also, the opinion purports to require a written fee agreement.15 The
Committee andBoarddo not have rule-making authority. Ethics opinions are
advisory only,'56 and the Committee and Board do not have the authority to
require written fee agreements in matters where Kentucky's rules of
professional conduct do not require written agreements.'i 7
E. Representation ofFiduciaries
KBA E-40 118 is a very important opinion. The thrust of the opinion is
that an attorney hired by a fiduciary represents the fiduciary, not the trust or
estate or beneficiaries. The attorney may represent the beneficiaries as well
so long as there is consent and no disabling conflict of interest. The opinion
makes the following points:
1. In representing a fiduciary the lawyer's client relationship is with the
fiduciary and not with the trust or estate, nor with the beneficiaries of a trust
or estate.
2. The fact that a fiduciary has obligations to the beneficiaries of the
trust or estate does not in itself either expand or limit the lawyer's
" See supra note 151, at 43-44.
154 See supra note 151, at44.
"'
5 5 See supra note 151, at 44.
151 See S.C.R. 3.530(3).
'17 S.C.R. 3.130-1.5(c) requires only contingent fee agreements to be in writing.




obligations to the fiduciary under the Rules of Professional Conduct, nor
impose on the lawyer obligations toward the beneficiaries that the lawyer
would not have toward other third parties.
3. The lawyer's obligation to preserve client's confidences under Rule
1.6 is not altered by the circumstance that the client is a fiduciary.
4. A lawyer has a duty to advise multiple parties who are involved with
a decedent's estate or trust regarding the identity of the lawyer's client, and
the lawyer's obligations to that client A lawyer should not imply that the
lawyer represents the estate or trust or the beneficiaries of the estate or trust
because of the probability of confusion. Further, in order to avoid such
confusion, a lawyer should not use the term "lawyer for the estate" or the
term "lawyer for the trust" on documents or correspondence or in other
dealings with the fiduciary or the beneficiaries.
5. A lawyer may represent the fiduciary of a decedent's estate or a trust
and the beneficiaries of an estate or trust if the lawyer obtains the consent of
the multiple clients, and explains the limitations on the lawyer's actions in
the event a conflict arises, and the consequences to the clients if a conflict
occurs. Further, a lawyer may obtain the consent of multiple clients only
after appropriate consultation with the multiple clients at the time of the
commencement of the representation.'
59
Estate practitioners should follow the advice of KBA E-401.
Representing only the fiduciary, and making that fact clear to the
beneficiaries, will shield the lawyer from discipline"6 and malpractice
liability.' 6'
159 Id.
'60 See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Hays, 937 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1996)
(disciplining attorney for conflict and neglect in representing members of his
family).
. 161 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Cramer, 695 A.2d 603 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (finding
attorney for personal representative to have no duty to beneficiaries of estate), cert.
granted, 702 A.2d 291 (Md. 1997).
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